Procurement auctions carry substantial risk when the value of the project is highly uncertain and known only to insiders. This paper reports the results from a series of experiments comparing the performance of three auction formats in such complex and risky settings. In the experiment, every bidder knows the private value for the project but only a single insider bidder knows the common-value part. In addition to the standard second-price and English auctions we test the "qualifying auction," a two-stage format that is commonly used in the sale of complex and risky assets. The qualifying auction has a fully "revealing" equilibrium that implements the revenue-maximizing outcome but it also has an uninformative "babbling" equilibrium in which bidders place arbitrarily high bids in the first stage. In the experiments, the latter equilibrium has more drawing power, which causes the qualifying auction to perform much worse than the English auction and only slightly better than the second-price auction.
Introduction
Procurement can be a risky activity, which sometimes goes spectacularly wrong. For instance, the supersonic passenger jet Concorde may never have generated a positive yearly profit for either British Airways or Air France, and, clearly, the net value of the project has been negative.
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Similarly, the Channel Tunnel between England and France "took a year longer to build than planned and cost twice the forecasted budget, so that by the time it was finished in 1994, ten billion pound had been sunk into a magnificent hole in the ground," Murray (2004) . The British Tourist Authority originally estimated that "In the first full year of operation, between 26 million and 29 million passengers will use the tunnel." Ten years later, the figure has yet to reach seven million. Richard Shirrefs, a former chief executive of Eurotunnel, acknowledged that "without a doubt, the Channel Tunnel would not have been built if we had known about these problems" (see The Economist, 2004) . While these mishaps may have been caused by political considerations clouding economic judgement, it seems likely that the enormous uncertainty about the project's value played a crucial role.
In procurement settings, potential contractors often differ in their costs of carrying out the project but a significant part of its value is common to all. This type of common-value uncertainty introduces considerable strategic complexity especially when some bidders are better informed than others. Good procurement design should aim to mitigate the adverse effects of asymmetric common-value information to avoid low revenues when bidders (over)compensate for the common-value uncertainty or to avoid bankruptcies if they don't. While the latter scenario may entail high procurement revenues in the short run it will ultimately hurt the industry and negatively impact future procurement.
The long-run consequences of poor auction design are illustrated by the procurement of large infrastructure projects in the Netherlands in the eighties and nineties (such as the Schiphol tunnel that was built to allow railway access to the national airport). The Dutch construction sector has been plagued by a cartel pervasive enough for the Dutch Parliament to start an inquiry. Presumably, the main reason for running a cartel is to be able to coordinate on high prices. However, firms testified that the bidding ring was used mainly to reduce the uncertainty associated with carrying out the project. The workings of the cartel provide some credence to their claims. Prior to the official procurement organized by the government, firms met in the proverbial "smoke filled room." Each firm would write its planned bid on a piece of paper, fold it, and put it under an ashtray. Then the project was discussed. If during these discussions a firm realized its engineers had overlooked a construction problem, it would remove its bid from under the ashtray.
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After the discussion phase, all remaining bids were revealed. The lowest bidder would be selected to participate in the actual procurement auction with a marked up bid, and if this bidder won the project the mark up would be used to compensate other ringer members. We do not suggest that information sharing (rather than price collusion) was the main motive for participating in the cartel, but many firms complained that (without the cartel) the sealed-bid procurement used by the Dutch government was "too competitive" and "almost surely resulted in a winner's curse." In this paper, we test with an experiment whether other procurement formats better protect bidders from the adverse effects of asymmetric commonvalue information.
Another situation with substantial common value risk occurs when public assets are privatized and a single "insider" bidder (e.g. a state-owned firm's incumbent management) is better informed about the asset's common value. Interestingly, the World Bank's "practitioners' guide" to privatization promotes a two-stage format where in the first stage, non-binding expressions of interest are received from potential buyers. Based on these expressions of interest and a review of the financial capacity of potential bidders a short list of potential buyers is selected. These bidders then move to the second stage of the process, which consists of a more traditional auction with binding bids, see Welch and Frémont (1998, p. 32 ) for more details. Boone and Goeree (2005) analyze the following variant: all bidders make non-binding bids in the first stage after which all but the lowest first-stage bidder qualify for the second stage, in which a second-price auction is used. They show this "qualifying" auction greatly alleviates winner's curse problems. In fact, there exists a full-revelation equilibrium of the qualifying auction that implements the revenue-maximizing outcome. This equilibrium, however, is not unique. There also exists an uninformative equilibrium where all bidders bid the highest possible amount in the first stage to ensure their participation in the second stage.
Which equilibrium of the qualifying auction is more likely to be selected is an empirical question, which we address using a controlled laboratory experiment. In addition, we compare the performance of the qualifying auction to that of the second price and English auctions. We find that the winner's curse has dramatic consequences for the sealed-bid second-price format: efficiency and revenue are low and uninformed bidders lose money on average. The English 2 One firm recalls removing its bid from under the ashtray when it realized that the construction of a bridge required six pillars, one more than its bid accounted for.
3 There is an incentive for firms to distort their information and present a more pessimistic view about the project's value in an attempt to scare others from taking on the project. However, the cartel met repeatedly and cheating would certainly be punished in future encounters. auction is far superior: efficiency is high (close to 90%) as are revenues, leaving modest but positive earnings for informed and uninformed bidders. The qualifying auction performs better than the second-price auction but not nearly as well as the English auction mainly because the uninformative equilibrium is observed more frequently in the data. Kagel et al. (2004) report results from a related study in which they experimentally test Ye's (2004) model for the qualifying auction. In Ye's approach, firm's have to decide whether to incur high (due diligence) costs to find out the value of a risky asset (such as an electricity plant). If firms have only a small chance of winning the asset they would not want to invest substantial sums of money to learn its common value. Ye (2004) therefore assumes that the first stage of the process is used to reduce the number of participants to such an extent that it becomes profitable for firms to invest in due diligence. His main result is that efficient entry cannot be guaranteed by a qualifying auction while there exist other mechanisms that can.
Contrary to theoretical predictions, however, the experimental analysis in Kagel et al. (2004) shows that the efficiency performance of the qualifying auction is actually not worse than that of the alternative procedures. The main difference with our framework is that Ye assumes bidders are symmetric and entry into the second stage is costly, we consider free entry but assume that one bidder (the insider) is informed. 
Experimental Design and Procedures
We ran twelve computerized experiments each consisting of 20 auction periods, see Table 1 .
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The sales format was either an English auction, a qualifying auction, or a second-price auction.
In each of the three treatments, there were 40 subjects, divided into 10 groups of 4 subjects.
Subjects' values for the (single) asset were equal to a private value plus a (common value) bonus.
The private values were iid draws from a uniform distribution on [60, 100] and the bonus was either 50 or -50, with equal probability. In each group there were two types of bidders: 1 informed bidder and 3 uninformed bidders. All bidders knew their private values but only the informed bidder knew the group's bonus. In each period, the informed bidder was randomly picked, i.e. every subject had an equal chance of being informed. 4 The experiments were programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher 1999 In the English auction the price starts at 0 points and rises at a speed of 1 point every 0.5 seconds. Bidders' screens display the rising price level, whether the informed bidder was active, and how many uninformed bidders were active. At the start of the auction all bidders were presumed to be active but as price levels rose they could push a "drop out" button to indicate they were no longer active. After a bidder dropped out, the price clock would be paused for 10 seconds to give remaining bidders the chance to digest the information. During these 10 seconds no one could drop out. The final remaining bidder in a group received the private value Finally, in the second-price auction all four bidders place bids between 0 and 200 points.
The highest bidder receives the private value plus the bonus and pays the second-highest bid.
In all cases, ties are resolved at random.
The methods used to determine the values and types of the subjects, as well as the auction rules, were explained with instructions presented before each experiment. These instructions were projected on a screen and read aloud so that they would be common knowledge. At the beginning of the experiments, each subject received 50 points to which their earnings in each of the 20 auctions were added. At the end of the experiment, subjects were paid $1 for every 5 points (plus a show-up fee of $5). Bidders whose cumulative profits were negative at the end of the experiment received only the show-up fee.
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For statistical purposes, the private values, 5 Data from groups in which one or more bidders went bankrupt are not used in the analysis reported below.
common values, groups and types for each bidder in each period were randomly drawn before the experiments, and reused for each of the three treatments. Also, the composition of the groups stayed the same during the experiments.
Before the experiment started, subjects were asked to fill out a questionnaire to make sure they understood how their profits were determined. In this questionnaire, the subjects were given a set of random bids and a private value (determined by the roll of two dice), and then given the outcome of the auction (you won/you lost) and the common value for their group.
They were then asked to calculate their own profits with these values. The numbers used for the questionnaire were chosen so they would not be in the range of numbers the subjects would see in the experiment, to emphasize that this was just to practice the payoff calculations. All experiments were conducted at the Social Science Experimental Laboratory (SSEL) at Caltech.
Theoretical Predictions
In this section, we discuss the equilibrium strategies for the informed and uninformed bidders for the three auction formats used in the experiment. Proofs of the lemmas below can be found in Boone and Goeree (2005) .
English Auction
The informed bidder, I, drops out when the price level reaches the sum of the private and common value components: b I (v I ) = v I ± 50 (where ±50 means that I bids 50 points above her private value in case of a positive bonus and 50 points below her private value otherwise).
For the uninformed bidders the equilibrium strategy takes the form of a cut-point rule. These bidders bid low when their private value v U is below 80 and bid high when v U is above 80. The following lemma summarizes the optimal strategy for the English auction (see also HernandoVeciana, 2005, and Hernando-Veciana and Tröge, 2004) .
Lemma 1 The informed bidder drops out at
When the informed bidder is active, the uninformed bidder drops out at
If the informed bidder drops out at some price level p, an uninformed bidder drops out at
Two aspects of this strategy are surprising. First, some uninformed bidders (with v U ≥ 80) bid as if they have good news about the asset (which they do not). Second, as long as the informed bidder is active, no uninformed bidder drops out in the price range [30, 130] . To glean some intuition, consider an uninformed bidder with v U = 80. Once the price reaches 30, two things can happen. The informed bidder drops out at some price in the range [30, 50] implying that the common value equals −50. Or, the informed bidder drops out at some price above 110. By switching from dropping out at 30 to dropping out at 130, the uninformed bidder may lose money in the former case and may gain money in the latter case. Due to the symmetry of the uniform distribution, the expected gains and losses cancel for an uninformed bidder with v U = 80. For lower types the expected losses exceed the expected gains, and, hence, they strictly prefer bidding low. The reverse is true for higher types.
Note that the allocation of the asset in the English auction can be inefficient. This occurs if v I < v U < 80 with a positive bonus or if 80 < v U < v I with a negative bonus. In the former case, the informed bidder wins the auction while there is an uninformed bidder with a higher valuation of the asset. In the latter case, an uninformed bidder wins the auction while the informed bidder has a higher valuation.
Second-Price Auction
In the English auction, uninformed bidders can drop out immediately after the informed bidder drops out at a low price. In contrast, in a sealed-bid framework there is no opportunity for the uninformed bidders to learn about the asset's common value. As a result, a winning uninformed bidder may have to pay another uninformed bidder's high bid when the bonus is −50. To avoid such a loss (of approximately 100) uninformed bidders will bid more cautiously in the second-price auction compared to the English auction.
Lemma 2 The informed bidder bids
Figure 1 in the Appendix shows this bid function (solid line) together with that of the English auction (short dashes). Clearly, the expected uninformed bid in a second price auction will be lower than that in an English auction. First, in the second price auction the probability of a low bid is higher. Second, the high bid in the second price auction is below the high bid in the 
Qualifying Auction
As described in section 2, the qualifying auction consists of two stages, with non-binding firststage bids and binding second-stage bids. Like the English auction, the first stage allows uninformed bidders to receive information about the asset's common value. The following lemma describes an equilibrium for the qualifying auction.
Lemma 3 In the first stage optimal bids equal the bidder's (unconditional) expected valuations of the asset:
b I (v I ) = v I ± 50 b U (v U ) = v U
After being told the losing bid and the losing bidder's identity, the remaining uninformed bidders are able to infer the bonus (−50 if the losing bidder is informed, +50 otherwise). In the second stage the optimal bid for all remaining bidders is
To see that there is no incentive for the informed bidder to deviate, suppose the informed bidder wants to convey bad news about the common value when the bonus equals +50. She can only do so by bidding low, but then she will not be able to participate in the second stage.
Likewise, if the bonus is −50 points and the informed bidder bids as if it were +50 points, the uninformed bidders expect the common value to be +50 and outbid the informed bidder in the second stage. Boone and Goeree (2005) show that this "revealing" equilibrium implements the revenuemaximizing outcome. It is not fully efficient: when the bonus is low and the informed bidder has the highest private value, the object will be assigned to an uninformed bidder (since the informed bidder will not make it to the second stage). In all other cases, the object is allocated efficiently.
The revealing equilibrium is also not unique; the next Lemma describes an uninformative equilibrium. 
where B(v) is shown in Figure 1 ( 
This "babbling" equilibrium arises when bidders do not wish to reveal their valuations to other bidders. For the informed bidder this creates an opportunity to take advantage of the uninformed bidders' lack of information in the second stage.
Results: Aggregate Data
In this section we report aggregate results such as efficiency (E), revenue (R), and bidders' earnings (π). We define the auction's efficiency as:
where v winner is the private value of the auction's winner, v low is the lowest private value within the group, and v high is the highest private value within the group.
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Revenue is equal to the winner's payment and the winner's earnings equal her total value minus her payment (losing bidders earn nothing). The theoretical predictions reported below are based on the private values and bonuses that were used in the experiments.
Revenue: The top row in Table 2 shows predicted (left panel) and observed (right panel)
revenues for the three auction formats. In theory, the revealing equilibrium of the qualifying auction results in the highest revenue, followed by the English auction, the babbling equilibrium of the qualifying auction, and, finally, the second price auction. This ranking is also reflected by the cumulative distributions of revenues shown in the top panel of Figure 2 (in the Appendix). Table 2 . Aggregate statistics.
The bottom panel of Figure 2 shows the observed distributions of revenues in the three formats. The distribution of revenues in the English auction is shifted to the right and dominates the revenue distributions of the other two formats (in the sense of first-degree stochastic dominance). The distribution of revenues in the qualifying auction seemingly dominates that of the second price auction but the differences are not significant. The middle panel of Table 3 shows t-statistics for revenue differences across formats; the results reinforce the conclusion that the English auction revenue dominates the other formats while the second price and qualifying auctions yield similar revenues:
where * * indicates significantly higher at the 1% level.
Efficiency: In theory, efficiency should be highest in the English auction, followed by the qualifying auction, and then the second price auction. This ranking is also observed in the data, see the middle panel of Table 3 . Again the differences between the English auction and the other two formats are highly significant, while the second price and qualifying auctions lead to similar efficiency levels:
The magnitude of of the inefficiencies that occur in the second price auction can be inferred from the second row of Table 3 .
t-statistics for comparisons across formats: theory (top panel), observed (middle panel), and theory vs. observed (bottom panel).
to 87% in the English auction. This suggests one reason why revenue is lower in the second price auction; the pie to be divided between bidders and the seller is smaller. Another reason, however, is that informed bidders often gain windfall profits in the second price auction.
Bidders' Profits:
The third row in Table 2 shows bidders' earnings; rows 4 and 5 show how these earnings are split between the informed and uninformed bidders. In the English auction, the informed and uninformed bidders make similar profits that are modest in size. In contrast, in the second price auction, uninformed bidders lose money on average while the informed bidder makes a large profit. In the qualifying auction, the informed bidder also makes a substantial profit but now the uninformed bidders' earnings are positive. Aggregating the profits for the informed and uninformed bidders shows:
see the earnings column in the middle panel of Table 3 . The final two columns in that panel demonstrate that the uninformed bidders are significantly better off in the English or qualifying auction compared to the second price auction. In contrast, the informed bidder is significantly worse off in the English auction.
Summary: Applying standard criteria to evaluate alternative auction formats, i.e. efficiency, revenue, and non-negative bidder profits, results in a clear winner. The English auction is highly efficient, produces the most revenue, and provides modest profits for the informed and uninformed bidders. In contrast, the second price auction results in the lowest efficiency and revenue levels and uninformed bidders lose money on average. Finally, the qualifying auction performs somewhat better than the second price auction but not nearly as well as the English auction.
The bottom panel of Table 3 compares observed behavior with theoretical predictions. Note that actual efficiency levels are significantly lower than predicted in all three formats. The other measures, however, nicely conform to theoretical predictions, where for the qualifying auction it is the babbling equilibrium that has the most drawing power. In other words, ideally the uninformed bidders bid as if they know the bonus and all bids lie on the 45-degree line ranging between 10 and 50 when the bonus is low and between 110 and 150 when the bonus is high. This is the rationale for plotting bids against total values.
Results: Individual Data

English auction:
The top panel of Figure 3 shows that bidding behavior in the open ascending auction is close to ideal, i.e. the vast majority of the bids and payments are organized around the lower 45-degree line when the bonus is low and around the upper 45-degree line when the bonus is high. Furthermore, the many filled triangles near the upper 45-degree line indicate that it is not necessarily the informed bidder who wins in case of good news. Likewise, it is not always an uninformed bidder that wins in case of bad news.
There is a second 45-degree line on the lower right side of the top panel, which corresponds to uninformed bidders dropping out at their private value minus 50. In only seven (out of 160) auctions, however, did all three uninformed bidders drop out at low prices when the bonus was high. Note that in 6 out of these 7 cases the winner's payment is drawn to the left of 130, suggesting that the uninformed bidders' private values are less than 80 and their drop-out choices conform to Lemma 1. (Indeed, there are far more triangles to the left than to the right of 130.) In addition, there are 11 auctions where the informed bidder drops out at low prices even though she knew the bonus was high. Presumably, this occurred because the informed bidder reasoned that the uninformed bidders would trail her, resulting in low (or no) profits.
There are some bids in the upper-left part of the top panel, which led to large losses in 8 auctions. Seven of these losses are incurred by uninformed bidders who are "tricked" by the informed bidder. The informed bidder, knowing that the bonus is low, stays in the auction beyond 50, which suggests to the uninformed bidders that the bonus is high. Then the informed bidder drops out near 110, i.e. before any one of the uninformed bidders drops out, to ensure she does not incur the loss herself. Note that in one instance this plan backfired and the informed bidder had to pay more than 80 for an item that was worth less than 50.
To summarize, bidding behavior in the English auction conforms nicely to theoretical predictions and close to 90% of all outcomes are close to ideal, i.e. as if the uninformed bidders knew the common value. The few deviations explain why observed efficiency is somewhat lower than predicted. The effects of such deviations on revenue are a wash, however. They result in higher revenues when the informed bidder tricks others in believing that the bonus is high when it is not and they lead to lower revenues when the uninformed bidders drop out early because of their low private values (Lemma 1).
Second price auction:
Observed behavior in the sealed bid second price auction is very different.
Most notable is the high frequency with which the informed bidder wins the auction when the bonus is high (see the predominance of filled squares on the right side of the middle panel).
In contrast, the many filled triangles on the left side indicate that when the bonus is low the auction is almost always won by an uninformed bidder. This explains the large discrepancy in earnings of the informed and uninformed bidders.
Note that the upper 45-degree line on the right side consists mostly of informed bids (squares) while the lower 45-degree line on the right consists mostly of uninformed bids (triangles). This is predicted by the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of Lemma 2. Deviations from this equilibrium occur when uninformed bidders with a low private value bid high (see the filled triangles in the 60-80 range on the left) or when uninformed bidders with a high private value bid low (see the triangles in the 40-50 range on the far right). Both types of deviations lower efficiency; the former deviation hurts uninformed bidders' profits while the informed bidder gains from the latter deviation.
Qualifying auction:
The bottom panel of Figure 3 suggests that bids in the qualifying auction form a "hybrid" case. Like in the ascending auction there are quite a few instances where an uninformed bidder wins when the bonus is high, while there are only two cases where an uninformed bidder is tricked into believing the bonus is high when it is not. Unlike in the ascending auction, however, there are few payments on the upper 45-degree line when the bonus is high. Indeed, the scatter plot of payments on the right side more closely resembles that of the second price auction. The main positive effect of the qualifying stage seems to be the (random) exclusion of one of the bidders, with the remaining bidders competing in a sealed-bid section price auction.
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In other words, subjects seem to bid according to the babbling equilibrium of Lemma 4. This conclusion is corroborated by Table 4 , which lists the probabilities with which the informed bidder enters the second stage. Recall from Lemma 4 that in the babbling equilibrium, all bidders put in the maximum first-stage bid (of 200) and the insider bidder's chance of entering the second stage is 75%. The bottom row shows that when the bonus is high, this is exactly what happens in the experiment. When the bonus is low, the informed bidder does not always find it worthwhile to make it to the second stage. Only in 50% of the cases does she bid the maximum.
Summary:
One remarkable feature of our data is the close resemblance with theoretical predictions. There have been numerous private-value second price auction experiments showing substantial overbidding relative to bidders' values, e.g. Kagel (1995) . Likewise, there have been numerous experiments demonstrating the robustness of the winner's curse in common value auctions, e.g. Kagel and Levin (2002) . Even though our setup with private and common values is more complicated than that of previous studies, observed bids are organized around the relevant 45-degree lines in all three panels of Figure 3 . To study this in more detail, we also computed empirical bidding functions by taking moving averages of observed bids for each value category. In particular, for uninformed bidders we took the average for each private value category and for the informed bidders we took the average for each total value category (private value plus bonus). Then we averaged 5 categories to form moving averages.
The top panel of Figure The middle panel shows empirical bidding functions in the second price auction. Behavior of the informed bidders again nicely conforms with bidding ones total value. For the uninformed bidders we did not split the bids into low and high bids, because this resulted in no discernable pattern (unlike in the English auction). The empirical bidding function for the uninformed bidders is parallel to bidding ones value minus 50, but exceeds this line by 10 or so points. This is the reason that uninformed bidders' profits are negative: the inflated bids reduce the informed bidder's profit when the informed bidder wins (which typically occurs when the bonus is high, i.e. with probability .5) and lowers the uninformed bidders' profits otherwise (see Table   2 ).
Finally, the bottom panel of Figure 4 shows the empirical bids for the two stages of the qualifying auction. The three top lines depict the moving averages of the first-stage bids.
Obviously, uninformed bidders and informed bidders who received good news are selecting the babbling equilibrium by putting in first-stage bids that exceed the highest possible total value. The first-stage informed bids are somewhat lower when the bonus is low, which helps uninformed bidders avoid the winner's curse to some degree. Second stage informed bids again nicely conform to bidding ones total value and second stage uninformed bids parallel but exceed bidding ones value minus 50. Indeed, the second stage bids of the bottom panel are very similar to the bids in the middle panel. Hence, the improved performance of the qualifying auction vis-a-vis the second price auction is not due to different bidding behavior (as predicted by the revealing equilibrium of Lemma 3) but rather to the (almost) random exclusion of one of the bidders (as predicted by the babbling equilibrium of Lemma 4).
Conclusion
Procurement and privatization auctions can be complex and risky. Consider, for instance, the case where a state-owned firm is put up for bid. Interested parties may differ in terms of their abilities to exploit the firm's resources, which translates into different private values. In addition, the firm's profitability may depend on the industry's general outlook, which applies to all bidders. Hence, bidders' values contain both private and common value elements. To complicate matters, bidders often differ in terms of the quality of the information they possess, which aggravates adverse selection effects inherent to auctions where common values play a role.
In this paper, we experimentally study bidding behavior in such complex and risky settings.
In the experiment, bidders' values for the object for sale consist of both a private value part plus a common value bonus. The bonus is relatively large compared to private value differences to stress the common value risk. Furthermore, a single insider bidder is told the common value bonus to stress informational asymmetries. Laboratory experiments provide an ideal tool to measure the efficacy of alternative auction formats in this environment.
We compare three formats: the ascending English auction, the sealed-bid second-price auction, and the qualifying auction, a two-stage format advocated by the World Bank to privatize firms (see Welch and Frémont, 1998) . In the first stage of the qualifying auction, bidders place non-binding bids to determine who qualifies for the second stage, which consists of a standard second-price auction. Boone and Goeree (2005) show theoretically that the qualifying auction has a fully "revealing" equilibrium that implements the revenue-maximizing outcome. In addition, it has an uninformative or "babbling" equilibrium where bidders place arbitrarily high bids in the first stage. Laboratory experiments allow for a careful evaluation of the resulting equilibrium selection problem.
Comparing the English auction with a sealed bid second price auction shows a dramatic difference in performance: the English auction is roughly 40% more efficient, generates almost 50% more revenue, reduces the informed bidder's windfall profits by a factor of seven, and protects uninformed bidders from making losses. Furthermore, our experimental results indicate that the babbling equilibrium has more drawing power in the qualifying auction. As a result, this format performs only slightly better than the second-price auction and much worse than the English auction.
Our results are important for improved auction design when valuations are complex and information asymmetries exist. The negative effects of using a sealed bid format are illustrated by the procurement of large infrastructure projects in the Netherlands in the eighties and nineties. Uninformed bidders complained they would almost surely fall prey to a winner's curse had they did not pooled their information before the auction. Of course, the resulting Dutch construction cartel that organized this type of information sharing also facilitated price collusion, which ultimately led to a parliamentary inquiry. Our results suggest that an ascending format, where information is revealed during the bidding process, might have led to a more healthy construction industry. 
